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Mutilation and the Law
in Early Medieval Europe and India:
A Comparative Study
PATRICIA SKINNER

In her survey Crime and Punishment in Ancient India, Sukla Das highlights
the occurrence—in religious texts, literary material, and legal digests—of the use
of branding and mutilation of the face and body to punish specific misdemean
ors, including theft, the sexual violation of women, female adultery, defamation,
and assault. Moreover, mutilation (including blinding of the eyes) might also be
prescribed instead of the death penalty for acts of treason, and was considered a
lenient alternative to death.1 Such penalties, the rhetoric surrounding their use,
and the circumstances in which they were prescribed sound very familiar to a his
torian of early medieval Europe, where the language and targets of such precepts
were similar to those set out in the Indian material.2 Yet drawing a comparison
between the two regions, or even suggesting that their similarities constitute a
“legal encounter,” is fraught with methodological problems. First, there is a clear
chronological mismatch between the development of the prevailing legal norms
of India and Europe; second, neither region can be treated as an undifferentiated
whole; third, there is an important qualitative difference between “legal” texts in
Europe and India; and finally, even if points of similarity and difference are identi
fied in the texts, these represent not so much a dialogue as a shared recognition
that the human body has always been an effective target for coercive and correc
tive practices.3 All of this leads to an inevitable conclusion that the correspond
ing passages in Hindu and Western European texts should not surprise us at all.
Yet the apparent incommensurability of the two regions in the period before
1200 CE has not deterred historians from demanding and attempting compara
tive work. Susan Reynolds, for example, recently has called specifically for more
comparative research on the laws of medieval Europe and India, and set out some
I should like to thank the editors for their invitation to write for TMG, the anonymous
readers for their constructive criticism, and the Wellcome Trust for the grant (no. 097469)
that supported research for this paper and my wider project on medieval disfigurement.
1 On blinding, see Bührer-Thierry, “‘Just Anger’”; and Wheatley, Stumbling Blocks.

2 Skinner, Living with Disfigurement, explores the evidence for Western Europe in detail.

3 Miller (Eye for an Eye) and Geltner (Flogging Others) articulate this point from legal and
historical perspectives.

The Medieval Globe 2.2 (2016)

10.17302/TMG.2-2.5 pp. 115–139

116

PATRICIA SKINNER

questions surrounding the relationships between the royal authority and the law,
the role of legal professionals, and the process of justice.4 This essay, whilst not
addressing all of those broader issues directly, will first highlight the problems of
comparison across time and place, before examining in detail a specific element
of the legal culture of both regions, the use of corporal punishment. It will ask
whether the representations of facial and bodily mutilation, in particular, suggest
similar ideas in each region about royal authority, honor (and, if so, whose), and
gender relations, and how these might have developed and changed between the
third and twelfth centuries CE.

Problems of Comparison, Slippages in Time,
Fragmentation of Space

The “comparative turn” in medieval history is no longer affecting only European
regions, and its expansion has been marked—and fueled—in the past two dec
ades by the appearance of serials such as The Medieval History Journal, edited
and published out of India, and thus complicating the category “medieval,” and
now by The Medieval Globe.5 To take just one example, the model of medieval
“feudalism,” which Marc Bloch envisioned might be tested on Japanese as well
as European society,6 is still being used to think through extra- as well as intraEuropean political frameworks in a way that stretches its validity (itself con
tentious) as a tool of analysis.7 As Reynolds and other historians of medieval
Europe have commented, however, comparison is hard work, and particularly so
when one is exploring a new area (for the present author, India) in which one
has relatively little previous research experience.8 Lack of linguistic training, in
particular, limits the survey of Indian texts used in this survey to those accessi
ble in English translation, which significantly compromises the study of technical
or descriptive words and phrases. (The English word “disfigurement,” for exam
ple, is regularly used as a catch-all term to translate a range of injuries to the face
reported in Latin and Greek source texts in the medieval West, highlighting the
potential pitfalls of relying on translated texts alone.) Bloch himself, however, was
4 Reynolds, “Early Medieval Law.”

5 Reuter, “Medieval: Another Tyrannous Construct?”; Mukhia, “‘Medieval India.’”
6 Bloch, La société féodale, 610–12.

7 Bagge, Feudalism: New Landscapes of Debate; Hendricz, “Is There Evidence?”; Heirbaut,
“Not European Feudalism”; Sharma, Early Medieval Indian Society; Chattopadhyaya, Making
of Early Medieval India, 212–14.

8 Reynolds, “Early Medieval Law.” See also Wickham, “Problems in Doing Comparative
History” and “Historical Transitions.”
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an advocate of comparison as a means of better understanding one’s own area of
expertise, and exposing assumptions that a model developed in one part of the
world was applicable, uncritically, elsewhere.9 (The subtlety of La société féodale
in this respect has often been overlooked by subsequent commentators and gen
erations of undergraduate students.) This caution is particularly applicable to the
present study: as J. Duncan Derrett pointed out long ago, one of the difficulties
for British colonial rulers in India was their assumption that Hindu dharmaśāstra
(the teaching or science of righteousness) could be equated with Western canon
law and separated from the secular concerns of the state. 10 This assumption, in
turn, affected the early Anglophone historiography of India. We shall return to the
nature of “law” below.
The first problem of comparison for the present study is the time frame
expressed by the term “early medieval.” In Europe, it has traditionally been seen as
the period from ca. 500 to ca. 1100, although the starting date is contested by those
who champion “late antiquity” as a specific period of transition, and the eleventh
century often appears in surveys of the “central” Middle Ages. Such mutability is
also visible in the historiography of early India. Brajadulal Chattopadhyaya situ
ates the “early medieval” from the seventh to thirteenth centuries CE,11 and this
estimation is echoed by Upinder Singh, who relates the start and end dates to the
fall of the Gupta Empire (ca. 550 CE) and the establishment of the Muslim Delhi
sultanate (1206), respectively.12 This periodization incorporates the Ghaznavid
conquest of parts of northwestern India under Mahmud (998–1030). But, as Singh
points out, alternative “early Middle Ages” have existed in Indian scholarship:
eschewing political frameworks, R. S. Sharma’s model of Indian feudalism places
the period as 400–1200 CE.13 The period of the Delhi Sultanate (1206–1526 CE)
has also been termed “early medieval” or “medieval” to distinguish it from the
“later medieval” Mughal state that lasted into the nineteenth century. (It is pos
sible to posit a “medieval” period extending this late in Jewish history as well, as
I have argued.14) But as Kesavan Veluthat points out, these are all chronologies
largely driven by northern Indian political developments, and largely ignore the
existence of the polities of the Rashtrakutas (ca. 750–1000 CE) and the Cholas (ca.
850–1280 CE, at its height till 1044 CE), whose hostilities in the early tenth cen
9 Bloch, Apologie pour l’histoire, 107.

10 Derrett, Dharmaśāstra and Juridical Literature, 2–4.

11 Chattopadhyaya, Making of Early Medieval India, 1–37.
12 Singh, Rethinking Early Medieval India, 1.
13 Sharma, Early Medieval Indian Society.

14 Skinner, “Viewpoint. Confronting the ‘Medieval.’”
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tury impacted kingdoms such as the Cheras in Kerala, which is documented as
a kingdom by the early ninth century.15 With these caveats in mind, the discus
sion that follows will focus on the period from the fifth to the eleventh centuries,
and compare Christian and Hindu precepts. It will exclude discussion of imported
Muslim norms but may utilize examples falling outside those beginning and end
ing dates.
Veluthat’s work exposes the second problem of comparing Europe and India in
this period: the shifting and heterogeneous political map of the latter. This, how
ever, should not cause undue concern. Just as temporal boundaries were being
challenged in the late 1990s as a hegemonic and Eurocentric historiographical
construct, so Martin Lewis and Kären Wigen challenge the spatial organization
of historical enquiry, the value-loaded terms “West” and “East,” and the assump
tion of coherence in organizing the world into seven “continents.”16 Drawing on
this work for their own study of medieval India, Catherine Asher and Cynthia Tal
bot comment that “we can view the presence of numerous kingdoms [in India] in
1000 CE as a normal course of affairs,” and suggest that, “like Europe, South Asia
had a common elite ‘civilization’ that served to unify it culturally in a general sense
prior to 1200, although there were many different local practices and beliefs.”17
One element of such elite “civilization” was religious culture as expressed in
the Hindu dharmaśāstra, the teaching of righteousness, which Derrett terms an
overarching, systematic presentation of precepts suited to the diversity of Indian
society. This framework, underpinning Indian jurisprudence in the medieval
period, was already centuries old, dating back to well before the Common Era, and
some have cautioned against treating it as “law” in the English sense of the word.18
Moreover, it was not unified or consistent.19 Surviving texts and commentaries
(smṛti) range in date from ca. 600 BCE onwards, though precise dating, attribu
tion, and place of composition remain vexed problems. Early Hindu law (even
the term “Hindu” is problematic) encompassed not only the impetus to punish a
criminal act, often with corporal punishment, and so to restore social order, but
also a desire to encourage the individual to perform penitential acts that would
rectify her/his offence against the moral order.20 As Patrick Olivelle comments,
the correlation between the two is often indistinct, but both were tied up in a reli
15 Veluthat, Early Medieval in South India, 1–3, 185, 196.
16 Lewis and Wigen, Myth of Continents.

17 Asher and Talbot, India before Europe, 9.

18 Lubin, Davis, and Krishnan, Hinduism and Law: An Introduction.

19 Dharmasūtras, xxv–xxxiv; Olivelle, “Dharmaśāstra: A Textual History.”

20 Lubin, Davis, and Krishnan, Hinduism and Law: An Introduction, 1–4.
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gious ideology that envisioned creating a virtuous human being and ensuring a
positive rebirth, since the fate of the transgressor who failed to perform penance
for her or his deeds would be to lose status between this life and the next.21 This
religious dimension, it seems to me, opens up a point of comparison straightaway.
Early law from the Visigothic, Lombard, and Anglo-Saxon kingdoms, and from the
Byzantine Empire (included as a further comparator) certainly prescribe corporal
punishments alongside monetary compensation, but they do not explicitly look to
encourage the transgressor to repent. This, in large part, was the responsibility
(at least after the conversion period in the fifth and sixth centuries) of the Church,
not the king or state, and Western Europe provides numerous examples of early
penitentials underpinning that duty.22 Yet, as numerous scholars have pointed
out, this apparent separation between punishment/law and penance/religion
in Western society is anything but: as Christianity became more institutionally
embedded within Western European kingdoms, laws were drafted by, and/or with
the assistance of, members of the clergy, and they incorporate, in a more or less
explicit fashion, biblical concepts of right and wrong.23 Whilst the replacement
of tit-for-tat violence with monetary payments might speak to Christian ideals,
the ruler’s right to inflict a corporal punishment—whether beating, branding, or
mutilation—draws upon not only Old Testament ideas of reciprocal injury but
also expresses an explicit reservation to the ruler of the right to punish physically
in order to enforce authority and make an example of the offender. The replace
ment of capital penalties with corporal ones, however, also signals that concern for
an offender’s soul demanded that he or she be given the opportunity to repent.24
Looking forward to the next life, therefore, was a core consideration in the judicial
cultures of both regions.
Ashutosh Dayal Mathur has argued for what he terms the secularization
of Hindu law between the eighth and seventeenth centuries, as commentators
sought to move away from law as dharma (righteousness)—the model described
by Olivelle for earlier centuries—and towards an understanding of law as a state
matter (vyavahāra), rather than a question of personal religious or moral conduct.
25
The pace of such change varied according to region, however, and vyavahāra is
in fact visible in much earlier material.26 But whereas earlier dharmaśāstras had
21 Olivelle, “Penance and Punishment”; see also Davis, “Before Virtue.”

22 Meens, Penitentials; McNeill and Gamer, Medieval Handbooks of Penance.
23 Wormald, Legal Culture; Evans, Law and Theology.

24 Gates and Marafioti, Capital and Corporal Punishment.

25 Mathur, Medieval Hindu Law.

26 Derrett, Dharmaśāastra and Juridical Literature, 31 and 36.
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made little distinction between civil or criminal disputes, later digests and com
mentaries paid more attention to offences that disturbed the order of the state
and/or might be brought to the king’s attention. The process that Mathur outlines,
therefore, is roughly contemporary with the period in European history when the
Germanic successor-states to the Roman Empire were beginning to produce codi
fied books of law. Written law mattered in both geographical spheres, it seems,
and functioned as a symbol of rulers’ authority. The plurality of early medieval
kingdoms and their law codes in Europe did not prevent similarities in their writ
ten forms, and this is also a useful way to think about the multiple commentar
ies existing across different Indian polities. The key difference lies in the fact that
whilst the texts of most early medieval law codes in Europe are datable to within
about a century (and some in fact carry dating clauses emphasizing when, in the
ruler’s reign, the codes were compiled), the complete and fragmented works of
law surviving from early India are hard to date because their purpose was entirely
different. Early Hindu texts, such as Kautilya’s Arthaśāstra (recently redated to the
fourth century CE, rather later than previously thought) had of course explicitly
set up some of the qualities and duties expected of the king, still framed in reli
gious terms; but medieval European laws varied in how much attention they paid
specifically to him, since the very existence of the codes themselves marked out
the king’s concern with the limitation of violence.
It is unlikely that the two historical developments—a more “state-like” king in
India, a focus on the king’s responsibility to keep peace in Europe—were linked.27
It is also debatable whether the transition outlined by Mathur for India led to
anything like a fully secularized law code replacing older customs and practices.
Chattopadhyaya comments that part of the process of change was the need for
“constant validation of power,” against the background of political fragmentation
among multiple kingdoms.28 The temporal and the sacred domain were too inter
dependent to permit a clear split, however. Thus the priestly validation of tem
poral power continued beyond the period of the so-called Hindu dynasties. The
full secularization of Indian law is, some commentators argue, not something that
even the modern Indian state has achieved.29 But it is clear that the Hindu laws
retained far more than they discarded, whilst the various law codes in Western
Europe are often distinguished by how much, or little, of preceding Roman (or
Germanic) law is visible in their provisions.
27 Kershaw, Peaceful Kings.

28 Chattopadhyaya, Making of Early Medieval India, 196–97.
29 Menski, Hindu Law, 24–25.
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For our purposes, the main issue to keep in mind is the rather obvious point
that no law is static: the written codifications and commentaries that historians
now use were more a starting point in a negotiation, rather than the end game,
and it is clear that legal precepts in India—and corresponding prescriptive texts in
Western European kingdoms and the Byzantine Empire—set up ideals of behav
ior that were, often, unenforceable. In both regions, however, the process of revis
ing and updating opinions allowed for flexibility as new situations arose. Reynolds
highlights the wealth of legal commentaries in India that medieval Europe does
not have (at least, until the twelfth century onwards), each shaping and offering
possibilities for new interpretations of older texts.30 In this sense, India seems
more akin to the medieval Islamic world.31 But in Europe, codes of law were sup
plemented and updated when regimes changed, and some of this material shows
signs of having responded to real situations. Overall, however, the picture pre
sented by these texts is explored here without any assumption (or “naï�ve accep
tance,” as Don Davis puts it)32 that it represents the social reality on the ground.
(As Davis notes, different texts served different purposes.) Some older, national
ist historians of India have emphasized the durable nature of the Hindu achieve
ment, focusing particularly on the areas of India that were not subject to Mus
lim conquest. For example, Ishwari Prasad stresses that the medieval period saw
“some of our best [legal] commentaries” emerge in south India.33 Yet even in areas
that did come to be under Muslim rule, Hindu culture seems to have been valued
rather than suppressed, and links were forged between the Mediterranean Sea
and Indian Ocean that permitted the transmission not only of goods but of ideas.34

Approaching Disfigurement as Injury: Honor and Shame

One way, perhaps, of drawing meaningful comparisons is to focus in on a very
specific manifestation of the law and/or social custom and/or moral compass in
each region, and to explore whether it occurs in similar circumstances as reported
by the texts, as was done for instance by Richard Larivière for ordeals.35 This
essay is interested in the phenomenon of facial appearance and disfigurement,
which appears most often in the context of legal codes and narrative sources. Both
30 Reynolds, “Early Medieval Law.”
31 See Reid, Law and Piety.

32 See Davis, “Toward a History of Documents,” in this issue.
33 Prasad, History of Medieval India, 549.
34 Wink, Al-Hind, 10.

35 Larivière, “Ordeals in Europe and India.”
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European and Indian cultures appear to have placed great importance on facial
appearance, including the presence, absence, or removal of facial hair. Barry Flood
comments that “the differentiation of ethnic and religious groups through the pre
scription of appropriate hairstyles or modes of facial hair was common to both
Indic and Islamic cultures,” and European historians, too, have noted its charged
qualities as a signifier of status.36 They might have added that facial perfection or
impairment was similarly loaded with meaning. As a comparative topic, therefore,
it seems a worthwhile seam to mine, and what follows is largely drawn from the
ostensibly “legal” texts, although set alongside narrative sources.
The historic mutilation of the face and body in Indian and European cultures
has already attracted the attention of some scholars. F. Barry Flood, for instance,
explores the meeting of Indian and Islamic cultures in records of the Indian prac
tice of cutting off little fingers or fingertips as a sign of submission to one’s lord.37
The removal of digits also features in some European texts, but there it is either
as a highly visible personal injury38 or as an extreme sign of tyrannical or even
diabolical behavior, as when the monastic chronicler Amatus of Montecassino
says that Gisulf II (1052–76/77), prince of Salerno, cut off the fingers and toes
of his wealthy hostage, Maurus of Amalfi, and made him eat them.39 (This was
after Gisulf had had Maurus’s eye gouged out.) Writing to please Gisulf’s eventual
conquerors and the patrons of his own abbey, the Norman lord Robert Guiscard
and his wife Sichelgaita, Amatus was implacably opposed to Prince Gisulf, which
clearly colors his narrative. And yet a report of finger-cutting in India is no less
problematic. Although its former attribution to the Persian sea-captain Buzurg
ibn Shahriyar (in a work commonly known as The Wonders of India) has now been
discarded, the account’s real author, a Cairene scholar named Abū ‘Imrān Mūsā
ibn Rabāh al-Awsī� al-Sī�rāfī�, was still writing with the perspective of an outsider.40
Is either report therefore to be trusted? This is a problem that dogs the evidence
surrounding mutilation, since its very prospect tended to induce fascination or
horror in those recording it. The same fascination, arguably, has shaped later his
torians looking for evidence of the “barbarity” of the medieval period, drawing
36 Flood, Objects of Translation, 63. See also Leyser, “Long-Haired Kings”; Bartlett, “The
Symbolic Meanings of Hair”; Dutton, Charlemagne’s Mustache.
37 Flood, Objects of Translation, 85.

38 As in the laws of King Æthelberht of Kent (Æthelberht’s code (Abt), § 53–58). See also
Oliver, Beginnings of English Law, 72–3.
39 Amatus of Montecassino, History of the Normans, 189–90.
40 Ducène, “Review.”
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upon not only reports such as these, but also folkloric and religious tales that are
hardly reliable indicators of social “norms” (see below).
Injuries in Indian law were classified as verbal (vākpāruṣya) or physical
(daṇḍapāruṣya). A similar categorization is found in European codes: the Salic law
from Francia lists penalties for both physical injuries (De debilitatibus) and insults
(De convitiis).41 The latter, mainly consisting of calling a person by the name of
an animal, was undoubtedly insulting to honor. Calling a man a coward, informer,
or liar threatened rather more damage to the reputation, requiring substantial
monetary compensation (as in the law of the Kentish kings Hlothere and Eadric on
calling someone a perjuror or “shamefully accosting him using mocking words”).42
Such transgressions, however, were largely limited to the social class in which the
offender and victim belonged: the balance of honor needed to be restored, but
vertical social ties do not appear to have figured in such offences. Other West
ern European cultures, however, posited insults as a serious challenge to vertical
authority: in Ireland, in particular, close attention was paid to the respective rank
of perpetrator and victim, and the high visibility of the poet in Irish society led to
multiple tales of physical facial blemishes spontaneously appearing on kings and
other social superiors by the effects of satirical verse.43 Even publicizing a physi
cal blemish by talking about it was regarded as an injurious act.44
In the Indian context, however, the effects of all verbal and physical injuries
were complicated by varna or caste. Transgression often meant loss of caste or
even rebirth as a non-human, and this may explain why punishments handed out
to the lowest group, the Ś� ūdra, were, and remain over time, so severe. Already at
the bottom of the pile, they were threatened with the most gruesome of punish
ments, often leading to death. For example, Gautama’s code orders that if a Ś� ūdra
uses violent language or violence against any member of the three upper classes,
the body part that committed the crime should be cut off. If a Ś� ūdra listens to a
Vedic recitation, his ears should be filled with molten metal; and if he repeats the
recitation, his tongue should be cut off.45 This treatment was in contrast to that
of other castes, who were more frequently fined for their transgressions. Yet the
difficulty rests in knowing whether this very ancient law retained its purchase in
later recapitulations. It would be tempting to see a parallel here with the frequent
distinctions in European law codes between those of different status—the free
41 Pactus legis Salicae, 112–20 (§ 29–30).

42 Translated in Oliver, Beginnings of English Law, 131.
43 Kelly, Guide to Early Irish Law, 43–44.
44 Ibid., 137.

45 Dharmaśūstras, 98 (Gautama 12).
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and the unfree, those with official titles and those without.46 Certainly slaves who
committed offences were punished more severely than the semi-free or free. Thus
in an addition to the Salic law of the Franks, a slave who struck a free woman
or untied her hair would lose his hand; but—and this is the crucial difference—
slaves were owned by someone else, and that person could, if they wished, miti
gate the threatened damage to their property by paying a fine.47 The Salic law also
permitted the master of a slave who was about to be castrated or tortured to with
hold the slave’s punishment by paying the penalty plus the slave’s value, though it
is debatable how often such a substitution might happen in practice.48
Turning to physical injuries, the classifications found in the later medieval
Indian commentary Vivāda Ratnākara (ca. 1300) have strong resonance with sim
ilar lists of injuries found in earlier European texts. In ascending order of serious
ness, physical offences in Vivāda Ratnākara included: defiling with touch; raising
a hand or weapon with intent; hurting without drawing blood; blood-shedding
injuries that were skin-deep, muscle-deep, or bone-deep; breaking of bones; and
severing or mutilation of organs.49 Defilement with touch was an injury particular
to Brahmin status, where impurity lurked in inanimate objects and everyday ges
tures and actions as well as in physical contact between persons. Such religious
defilement is not visible in the legal texts of medieval Europe, but it is notable that
some early codes did classify touching women in certain ways as injuries to be
compensated. A rather closer comparison can be drawn in the distinction between
bloodless and bloody injury, and the grading of the latter. This has strong paral
lels in early medieval European laws such as the Visigothic code of the seventh
century, which categorized wounds as slight, drawing blood, or down to the bone;50
or the probably contemporary Ripuarian and the slightly later Alamannic codes,
which retained the distinction between bloodless and bloody wounds (both add
ing the detail “if the blood touches the ground”) and, in the case of the Alemannic
code, added further distinctions of seriousness for head injury.51 Later still, in
medieval Welsh law, the three “dangerous wounds”—a blow to the head exposing
the brain, a blow to the body exposing the bowels, or the breaking of a limb—are
again distinguished from other types of injury.52 In both Indian and European cul
46 Geltner highlights this issue for ancient societies: Flogging Others, 37 and 44.
47 Pactus Legis Salicae, 260 (Capit. Addita 104.3).
48 Pactus Legis Salicae 58 (§ 12).

49 Mathur, Medieval Hindu Law, 177.

50 Leges Visigothorum, 262–63 (VI.4.1).

51 Lex Ribvaria, 73 (II); Pactus Legis Alamannorum, 116–17 (LVII [LIX]).
52 Laws of Hywel Dda, 24–26 (book I.3).
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tures, the visible wound or scar clearly threatened status:53 Baudhāyana asks, “If
a Brahmin has an open wound filled with pus and bloody discharge and a worm
appears in it, what penance should he observe?”54 Here, though, the problem
might well be the “worm”—a sign of decay and thus of degradation?—rather than
the original wound. Infection of wounds was, of course, also a sign of guilt associ
ated with medieval ordeals involving hot metal or water, so there may be a com
mon understanding of bodily corruption indicating corruption of the soul in these
parallel examples.

Disfigurement as Punishment

Facial mutilation as a punishment, however, was not as ubiquitous in Indian law
as Das seems to suggest (and in fact is something of a rarity as a punishment in
European texts as well). Certainly some very serious capital offences, such as
someone from the lowest caste speaking rudely to a Brahmin, could be commuted
to mutilation (in this case, the removal of the offending tongue).55 But early laws
forbid the capital or severe corporal punishment of Brahmins, limiting penalties
to the placing of permanent marks on their foreheads indicating their crimes56 in
a process explicitly described as branding.57 Similar markings in Western Europe
were prescribed, for example, in the case of a recidivist thief: the Lombard laws
say that one “should put a mark” (ponat ei signum) on his forehead and face, prob
ably by branding.58 In Byzantium (according to hagiographic sources, and thus
not specifically “legal” ones) tattooing was used in specific cases, such as that of
the martyred saints Theodore and Theophanes, known as the Graptoi (“those
written upon”).59 The Brahmins’ privilege, however, was withdrawn in later medi
eval commentaries, and it is by no means clear that all corporal punishment of
this class was banned earlier on. The ancient code of Ā� pastamba, for example,
states that a Brahmin guilty of theft should not be executed but “he should be
blindfolded”60 Olivelle does not believe this should be translated as “blinded”
53 Skinner, “Visible Prowess?”

54 Dharmasūtras, 152 (Baudhāyana 1.11.37).

55 Dharmasūtras, 71 (Ā� pastamba 2.27.14); Mathur, Medieval Hindu Law, 178.
56 Dharmasūtras, 53 (Ā� pastamba 2.10.16); Das, Crime and Punishment, 75.
57 Dharmasūtras, 160 (Baudhāyana 1.88.17).

58 Leges Langobardorum, 140 (Liutprand, LXXX [11]).
59 Byzantine Defenders of Images, 204.

60 Dharmasūtras, 71 (Ā� pastamba 2.27.17).
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because this would be inconsistent with the ban on corporal punishment.61 Yet
surely being convicted of theft when one occupied the highest caste was a matter
of extreme disgrace, and the alternative punishment that the translator suggests is
not really credible—unless the blindfold was to symbolize the thief’s moral blind
ness? Such an idea would not be implausible: with the Ā� pastamba, we are still in
an age when the religious and the secular were intertwined, and a similar rhetoric
of metaphorical blindness suffuses the writings of Christian commentators, too.62
In any case, law codes and religious precepts work on the basis of the threat of
mutilation, and its attendant social exclusion, and this was far more common than
its actual execution.
Medical care was sometimes prescribed in the codes for the victim of an ille
gal, disfiguring assault. Such care, however, only amounted to staunching a bleed
ing or continuously running wound (in Salic law)63 and/or removing bone splin
ters from injuries to the head and body in a number of other codes.64 Although
the legal precepts of early medieval Europe seem to have been very focused on the
appearance of the victim of an attack, the medical assistance that is described does
not seem to have extended to any form of cosmetic intervention. In contrast, it has
been claimed that the sheer prevalence of actual cases of judicial and vendettafuelled mutilation in India gave rise to precocious and sophisticated practices of
surgical reconstruction of the face, centuries before such procedures were “dis
covered” in Europe in the early modern era.65 This is a highly problematic conten
tion, however. Although early Sanskrit texts, such as that of Suśruta (ca. 600 BCE),
do suggest that ancient Indian surgical techniques were highly sophisticated—at
least in theory—and Indian barbers of the early Middle Ages have been character
ized as “celebrity surgeons,”66 linking the development of surgical competence to
a perceived need arising from judicial mutilation ignores the social disgrace inher
ent in being convicted, and the challenge to authority that such restorative surgery
might represent. Even if the written record of Indian surgical practice does indeed
point to a precocious art (or knowledge) of techniques of facial reconstruction,
this does not, I would argue, derive from the prevalence of queues of mutilated
patients. Ancient expertise in surgical techniques was already well-established
61 Dharmasūtras, 373.

62 Wheatley, Stumbling Blocks, 18–19, 65–72.
63 Pactus Legis Salicae 78 (XVII.7).

64 Pactus Legis Salicae. 77 (XVII.5); Pactus Legis Alamannorum, 21 (I.4); Lex Baiwariorum,
(IV.5, V.4, VI); Leges Frisionum, 71–74 (XXII).
65 Gilman, Making the Body Beautiful, 76.

66 Narayana and Subhose “Evolution of Surgery.”
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in Egypt long before the Sanskrit texts of Suśruta and others, as the Edwin Smith
papyrus (ca. 3000 BCE) illustrates.67 That said, recourse to a surgeon might in fact
represent resistance to authority on the part of elite victims. The challenge to legal
authority inherent in undertaking to fix a criminal’s face, moreover, is plausible
when we look at the occurrence of doctors in ancient Indian legal codes. Offer
ing medical assistance, indeed being a doctor at all, does not appear to have been
a particularly honorable role, in notable contrast to the apparent high status of
the early medieval doctor or medicus in Western European texts.68 Practicing
medicine was “a secondary sin causing loss of caste,”69 and selling medicines was
forbidden to the householder.70 If the medic was indeed something of a marginal
figure, perhaps the idea of reconstructing the mutilated faces of criminals is not
so far-fetched.
As in Western Europe, the contexts within which we find evidence of corpo
real and/or facial mutilation in India indicate it to have been a punishment inter
changeable with the death penalty. Das, drawing upon the seventh-century Tale of
Ten Princes/Young Men (Daśakumāracarita), highlights the gouging out of eyes as
a substitute for the death penalty in a case of treason.71 Mathur cites a surviving
twelfth-century inscription from the village of Lāhadpura, in the Gahadwal king
dom, threatening robbers with blinding or death.72 These crimes by definition dis
turbed the peace of the kingdom. There is one area, however, that does not seem
quite to fit this pattern, and that is the inflicting of facial mutilation on women.

Gender and Disfigurement

Early medieval European laws concerning women have been extensively studied
and are best characterized as heterogeneous when it comes to women’s agency
and freedom of action. At one end of the spectrum were those women “living
according to Roman law,” enjoying legal identity and a certain degree of auton
omy in the ownership and disposal of property. At the other end were women in
Lombard society (in northern Italy) who seem to have enjoyed no separate legal
personality at all, at least according to the law of King Rothari:73
67 Demaitre, Medieval Medicine, 2.

68 Pilsworth, “Could You Just Sign This?”

69 Dharmasūtras, 169 (Baudhāyana 2.13).
70 Ibid., 89 (Gautama 7.12).

71 Das, Crime and Punishment, 71.

72 Mathur, Medieval Hindu Law, 33.

73 Leges Langobardorum, 50 (Edictus CCIV).
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No woman living in our kingdom according to Lombard law may live
under her own control, that is selpmundia, but should always be under
the power of some man or the king; nor does she have the right to give
away or alienate any movable or immovable property, except with the
permission of him in whose guardianship (mundium) she is.74

This is extraordinarily similar in language to chapter 9 verse 3 of Manu’s
Authoritative Teaching of the Laws, which says:
When she is a girl, her father guards her; when she is a young woman,
her husband guards her; when she is an old woman her sons guard her.
A woman should never be on her own.75

Manu’s text, although very early (dating to ca. 200 CE), certainly has resonances
with Western European laws that establish guardianship over women (effectively,
power over their property and bodies) as a central aspect of male legal compe
tence. Stephanie Jamison has commented that Manu’s position—or at least the
language in which he articulated the law (he describes women as “whores”)—was
by far the most extreme statement of women’s legal incapacity in Indian jurispru
dence.76 It is tempting to deduce that the close guardianship is in fact an admis
sion of women’s relative agency. Jamison links Manu’s position, for instance, to the
rise of ascetic women in India who answered to no guardians.
At the heart of this apparently stringent supervision of women was anxiety
about female sexuality, and in particular of inappropriate liaisons outside of mar
riage. These are expressed in the laws in two forms—punishments for sexual liai
sons across caste boundaries, and for adulterous relationships. The former are
articulated in many early recensions of Indian law, including the Arthaśāstra,
where a low-status man (śvapāka) having relations with an Ārya woman was
killed, while she had her nose and ears cut off.77 Yet other early codes omit
explicit mention of the mutilation of the woman: Ā� pastamba simply states that
such a union makes her “sordid” and returns to the subject to prescribe death for
the man and “emaciation” for her.78 Whether this meant starving her to death or
inflicting a fasting penance (of which there were many versions in Indian law)
is unclear. In either case, however—mutilation or emaciation—the idea appears
74 Translation adapted from Lombard Laws, 92.
75 Quoted in Mahābhārata, 11.

76 Jamison, “Women ‘between the Empires.’” Others are included the law code of
Baudhāyana, 2.3.45: see Dharmasūtras, 175.
77 Cited by Parasher-Sen, “Naming and Social Exclusion,” 421.

78 Dharmasūtras, 32 and 70 (Ā� pastamba 1.21.1 and 2.27.8–9).

Mutilation and the Law in Early Medieval Europe and India

to be to deprive the woman of her beauty, as punishment for her inappropriate
liaison.
We can compare this to the censure of free women who had sex with male
slaves in European laws. The earlier laws of the Lombard king Rothari condemned
both partners to death, although the woman could also be sold outside the king
dom by her family, or become the property of the palace.79 King Liutprand later
modified this by removing the death penalty, and allowed for the woman’s rela
tives to deal with her before the penalty of enslavement was imposed.80 Such
unequal unions, however, could and did occur in medieval Western Europe:
Suzanne Wemple has pointed out that free Frankish women who married below
their station, whilst similarly condemned by the laws of that region, may have
stood to gain economically from such choices (living as a bound peasant might
have been more secure than living as a poor freewoman, for instance), particularly
since their lords usually guaranteed the free status of any children born of the
union.81 It is notable, of course, that unequal relationships the other way (lower
status woman, higher-status man) attracted far less attention in European than
in Indian legislation, the latter being concerned with questions of the caste of the
potential offspring.82
Turning to adultery, the mutilation of women’s faces certainly seems to feature
as one extreme measure in a spectrum of punishments. Das gathers some tenthcentury evidence for punishment of this type having been carried out.83 But the
inscription she cites from Kogali, in the western Chalukya kingdom (dated 992),
only prescribes that “the nose of the woman guilty of adultery is to be cut off and
the adulterer put to death.”84 There is no evidence that this was actually done.
And Das’s other piece of evidence, like that used by Flood for the finger-cutting
cited above, comes from an external observer. Moreover, the practice does not
appear in all of the ancient law codes, suggesting that—like the punishment for
sexual relations across caste—this type of punishment divided opinion. If any
thing, the developing legal framework discouraged such acts: the late twelfth-cen
tury jurist Devana Bhatta (fl. ca. 1150–1225) opposed the practice of husbands
79 Leges Langobardorum, 53–54 (Edictus CCXXI).

80 Leges Langobardorum, 118 (Liutprand XXIV [6]).
81 Wemple, Women in Frankish Society, 71–72.

82 For example, Gautama 4.16–28, which sets out the various combinations of parentage
and condemns children of “reverse” unions to illegitimacy: Dharmasūtras, 85.
83 Das, Crime and Punishment, 65–67.

84 Kannada Inscriptions from the Madras Presidency, no. 77.
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cutting off their adulterous wives’ noses and ears.85 This suggests that such pun
ishments were, if not “private,” then certainly not a measure condoned in the legal
world. Indeed, thinking back to women’s legal incapacity, it seems that adulterous
women were considered to have been more acted upon than the male actors in
Indian law (the Kogali inscription’s more severe punishment for the male part
ner seems to underline this); and so we find penance, rather than punishment,
prescribed in early codes such as Baudhāyana.86 The punishment of adulterous
wives in Western Europe was certainly, in some early laws, seen as the husband’s
prerogative, extending to permission to kill both the woman and her lover with
out penalty.87 A number of later codes, however, did threaten facial mutilation
as the appropriate punishment for sexual transgression: Byzantine laws of the
eighth century, Cnut’s English law of the eleventh, and southern Italian laws of the
twelfth century (as codified by Frederick II in the mid-thirteenth) all include such
punishments.88 But I have suggested that these references ultimately derive from
Old Testament precedents, specifically the story of the prostitute sisters Oholah
and Oholibah in Ezekiel 23, and do not reflect contemporary practices, particu
larly since these penalties are not actually recorded as having been carried out
in those regions.89 We could equally well posit three very specific contemporary
contexts for these metaphorical laws. Byzantium was suffering the pain of the
iconoclast controversy, and the faces of icons were being erased just as the threat
to erase facial features was issued; meanwhile, many saints of this era are said to
have been mutilated and marked for defending icons, as in the cases of Theodore
and Theophanes mentioned above. The law of King Cnut (990–1035) might have
been inspired by the biblical knowledge of his bishop, Wulfstan, but it could also
have derived from Viking traditions in his Danish homeland, where mutilation
was often preferred to the killing of kin.90 And the mutilation of women in twelfthcentury southern Italian law could have taken its cue either from the pre-existing
Byzantine model (though the applicability of Byzantine law in this region was by
then rather diluted) or from the same biblical model. Southern Italy and Sicily,
of course, also had histories of Muslim rule and influence, though again the “evi
85 Cited by Mathur, Medieval Hindu Law, 187.
86 Dharmasūtras, 175 (2.3.48–50).

87 For example, Leges Visigothorum, 149 (III.4); Leges Langobardorum, 51–52 (Edictus
CCXII).

88 Manual of Roman Law, ed. Freshfield; English Historical Documents, 458–59; Die
Konstitutionen Friedrichs II.
89 Skinner, “Gendered Nose.”

90 Van Eickels, “Gendered Violence,” 593.

Mutilation and the Law in Early Medieval Europe and India

dence” for the treatment of adulteresses in Islamic culture may have derived from
literary, rather than legal, sources.

Imagining Disfigurement?

These evidentiary uncertainties suggest that laws themselves can only take us so
far. However, it is significant that the facial mutilation of women seems to have
been a popular theme in medieval story-telling traditions throughout Eurasia.91
Famously, it features as an episode in the ancient story of Rama in the epic
Mahabharata, surviving in numerous versions and strands of early Indian liter
ature, and owing its continued popularity to the transformation of Rama from
human to supernatural figure early in the story’s development.92 Whilst in exile,
Rama persuades his half-brother Laksmana to disfigure the malignant demon
rākṣasī (fem.) Ravana’s sister Surpanakha. In revenge, Ravaņ� a captures and takes
away Rama’s wife Sita, who is only rescued with the aid of an army composed of
monkeys and bears. But what had Surpanakha done to merit such a violent act as
the removal of her nose and lips? Scharf explains that she is blamed for hostility
between Rama and Ravaņ� a’s brother Khara, whom Rama in fact kills. One ver
sion of Rama’s story goes further, suggesting that Rama and Laksmana engage in
a game of teasing Surpaņ� akha when she proposes marriage to one or the other;
and then, when she rushes towards Sita, threatening to eat her, Laksmaņ� a muti
lates her with Rama’s encouragement.93 As Peter Scharf comments, “the ethical
propriety of some of Rama’s actions is less than ideal.”94 Kathleen Erndl, too, has
reflected upon the incident involving Surpanakha, commenting that she had “got
ten a raw deal in a world where the rules were made by men.”95
The Mahabharata even contains a specific word for “one whose nose and lips
have been cut,” nikṛttanāsauṣṭhī.96 Given the popularity of the tale from its ancient
origins throughout the medieval period in India, would such a figure have been
familiar in real life, or was it just the most fantastical horror that could be imag
ined? I would suggest the latter, given the limited evidence in the legal codes as
attesting to this as a practice. Story-telling was a much better way to communicate
the boundaries of the acceptable to an audience, and it was perhaps useful to imag
91 Girón-Negrón, “How the Go-Between Cut Her Nose”; Skinner, “Gendered Nose.”
92 Rāmopākhyāna, 2.
93 Ibid., 9.
94 Ibid., 8.

95 Erndl, “Mutilation of Ś� ūrpaṇakhā,” 68.
96 Rāmopākhyāna, 227.
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ine Surpanakha as a woman behaving badly. Did her inappropriate approaches
to men, and threat to Sita, justify her cruel punishment? Or does the disfiguring
of Surpanakha function as a means of deflecting attention away from Sita’s own
reputation, compromised as it now was by Ravana’s capture of her, and requiring a
drastic ordeal (walking on fire) to rehabilitate her in her husband’s eyes?
Storytelling may in fact represent the one concrete link between South Asia
and medieval Europe, via the Middle East. Singh has highlighted that the expan
sion of the Arab world gave rise to a sharp increase in the collection and transla
tion of Sanskrit (and other) texts, an initiative focused on the court of the Abbasid
caliph Al-Ma’mum (r. 813–33) at Baghdad. As a result, many stories which circu
lated in the medieval Arab and European worlds ultimately derived much of their
material from Indian fables, in particular the Khalila-wa-Dimna collection, which
includes similar episodes of disfigurement.97 Violent or assertive women were
often characterized as stepping outside an acceptable norm of behavior and pun
ished violently in turn. We might think here of legal examples of females (though
not demons) whose engagement in violent or transgressive acts open them up
not only to corporal punishment but also to being disbarred from seeking com
pensation for injuries suffered. In Europe, Lombard law treated women involved
in sinful or unseemly violence (scandalum) harshly,98 whilst Irish law dismissed
injuries inflicted in a fight between women as inactionable.99

Conclusion

Was facial mutilation an “oriental” punishment that travelled West, or is it yet
another example of that nebulous category of “Indo-European” cultural practices
whose origins are lost to us but go back well before the Common Era? To take
another example, there are the parallels between stoning and burning as pun
ishments for adultery in Aztec law100 and in the Bible (Leviticus 21:9; John 8:7).
But Reynolds cautions against accepting apparent similarities at face value and
suggests that differences are the more thought-provoking elements in the sub
stance and processes of law, since “human beings find different solutions to simi
lar problems.”101 Perhaps it is best to think about the question another way: if the
death of a perpetrator was, for whatever reason, not an option, damage to the face
97 Girón-Negrón, “How the Go-Between Cut Her Nose.”

98 Balzaretti, “‘These Are Things That Men Do, Not Women.’”
99 Kelly, Guide to Early Irish Law, 79.

100 Offner, “Future of Aztec Law,” in this issue.
101 Reynolds, “Early Medieval Law,” 11.
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was the most visible way of indicating religious defilement, inflicting shame, or
signaling loss of status. The inspiration for European law codes that include this
practice might ultimately derive from a common, Old Testament model, or might
in fact be the coincidental product of different contexts. As Reynolds has pointed
out, it was probably local pressure that decided whether and how a miscreant
should be punished, and this may explain the apparent slippage between law and
practice regarding adulterous women.102 (Eventually, the paths followed by Indian
and European laws diverged in the former culture’s continued inclusion of pen
ance within punishment.) The linking of the two regions by trade connections
opens up the possibility that ideas about how to disfigure traveled with material
goods. Certainly, there is no doubt that Muslim geographers, whose “journeys”
were sometimes entirely virtual and whose texts often adhered to quite rigid
generic frameworks, may have inadvertently spread knowledge of exotic “won
ders” that were already centuries out of date.
The assumption that mutilation was ubiquitous in Indian culture, then, is
at best an over-reading of the often unreliable evidence, perhaps shaped by the
fact that the best-known product of Indian culture, the epic of the Mahabharata,
prominently features an episode of facial cutting. In both India and Europe, the
threat or the idea of facial disfigurement occurs far more frequently in the sur
viving evidence than actual examples of the practice being carried out. In both
regions, mutilation attracted the attention of lawmakers who wanted to express
the extremity and “otherness” of the practice, but few actually wanted to see it in
the flesh.

102 Ibid.
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Abstract This essay examines the similarities and differences between legal and
other precepts outlining corporal punishment in ancient and medieval Indian
and early medieval European laws. Responding to Susan Reynolds’s call for such
comparisons, it begins by outlining the challenges in doing so. Primarily, the frag
mented political landscape of both regions, where multiple rulers and spheres of
authority existed side-by-side, make a direct comparison complex. Moreover, the
time slippage between what scholarship understands to be the “early medieval”
period in each region needs to be taken into account, particularly given the per
sistence of some provisions and the adapatation or abandonment of others. The
paper goes on to consider how the body and face are presented as sites of injury
and punishment, and asks whether the prescriptive measures actually played out
in practice. Despite tangible links between the Indian subcontinent and Europe
during the period under review, it is concluded that direct influence of one set of
laws upon the other is unlikely.
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